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Abstract
The concept of agency as applied to technological artifacts has become an object of heated debate in the context of AI research 
because some AI researchers ascribe to programs the type of agency traditionally associated with humans. Confusion about 
agency is at the root of misconceptions about the possibilities for future AI. We introduce the concept of a triadic agency 
that includes the causal agency of artifacts and the intentional agency of humans to better describe what happens in AI as it 
functions in real-world contexts. We use the VW emission fraud case to explain triadic agency since in this case a techno-
logical artifact, namely software, was an essential part of the wrongdoing and the software might be said to have agency in 
the wrongdoing. We then extend the case to include futuristic AI, imagining AI that becomes more and more autonomous.
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1 Introduction
A good deal of attention is now being given to artificial intel-
ligence (AI) and its potential to be used in so many domains 
of human life. Although AI has many forms, it is generally 
correlated with the concept of autonomy, that is, AI systems 
are most often seen as autonomous to one degree or another 
(Castelfranchi and Falcone 2003). The term ‘autonomy’ is 
used by AI researchers as a metaphor to refer to a variety 
of different types of computational behaviour (Maes 1990; 
Pfeifer 1995; Steels 1995; Franklin and Graesser 1997; 
Dignum 1999; Dormoy and Kornman 1999; Jennings et al. 
2000; Lin et al. 2004; Tentori et al. 2006; Colburn and Shute 
2008; Stone et al. 2010; Noorman and Johnson 2014), but 
the multiplicity of its meanings (both for AI researchers and 
non-experts) can lead to miscommunication: ‘autonomy’ 
often suggests to those in the media and the lay public some-
thing out of human control, something worthy of concern 
and even fear (Johnson and Verdicchio 2017).
On some futuristic accounts AI will not just be out of the 
control of its designers but will become so sophisticated 
that it will, in some sense, take over the world (Barrat 2013; 
Dowd 2017). For example, in his book “Superintelligence”, 
Nick Bostrom speculates that AI will one day reach such 
a high level of development that it will start giving itself 
new goals and will build new artifacts to reach them, all 
this independently of humans, who will become irrelevant 
at best, extinct at worst (Bostrom 2014). Not coincidentally, 
at the same time that computer scientists are speculating 
about developments in AI, popular media—sci-fi movies, 
TV series, short stories and novels—are playing with and 
portraying AI robots that look and behave like humans (e.g. 
Ex Machina, Humans, Westworld).
The discussion of AI as autonomous is connected to 
notions of agency since, both in scholarly speculations 
and in fiction, the pivotal point seems to be when AI arti-
facts start acting “on their own”, that is, when their agency 
somehow transforms from the causal efficacy of objects to 
the intentional action that is usually only associated with 
conscious, intelligent beings (Johnson and Noorman 2014). 
Again, not coincidentally, although the focus of attention is 
most often on autonomy, notions of agency are also being 
discussed, challenged, and changed in academic discourse 
(Powers 2013; Sayes 2014).
In this paper, we want to focus on agency and we want 
to bring discussion of agency ‘down to earth’, so to speak. 
Firstly, we are concerned not just with agency in some 
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abstract or ontological sense; we are concerned with the 
notion of agency as it comes into play in issues of respon-
sibility (ethical and legal). To do this we begin with the 
Volkswagen (VW) emission fraud case (Hotten 2015), which 
we analyze with an eye to understanding the agency of a 
computational artifact. We then use this analysis as a basis 
for assessing speculation about futuristic AI agency. The 
VW case is embedded in a legal context, but our analysis is 
concerned with a more general view of responsibility, both 
ethical and legal.
Agency is traditionally defined as the capability of an 
entity to act (Schlosser 2015). In the most common accounts 
of agency, a distinction is made between behavior produced 
by mental states (intentional action) and behavior that can 
be explained in terms of material causal relations. It is the 
distinction, for example, between a person telling another 
person it is time to go and an alarm clock going off to alert 
a person that it is time to go. The former kind of agency 
is traditionally seen as exclusively human, while the latter 
is attributed to artifacts as well as humans. This distinc-
tion is fundamental when it comes to responsibility because 
human agents can be considered responsible (accountable, 
duty-bound, praiseworthy/blameworthy) for their actions, 
both ethically and legally, while artifacts cannot. For exam-
ple, a person might be praised for remembering that it was 
time to go and then alerting another, while the alarm clock 
would only be considered causally responsible for alerting 
the person; the alarm clock would not be considered morally 
praiseworthy for doing so, or legally liable for failing to do 
so (except in a joking way).
The concept of agency as applied to technological arti-
facts has become an object of heated debate in the context 
of AI research because some AI researchers ascribe to 
programs the type of agency traditionally associated with 
humans (Allen and Wallach 2012; Bostrom 2014; Malle 
and Scheutz 2015; Omohundro 2016; Yampolskiy 2016). 
Although these researchers rarely affirm an identity between 
the agency of programs and the agency of humans, they 
do not draw any distinction either, except to point out the 
greater efficiency and efficacy of the former, thanks to its 
being technological. This is controversial in part at least 
because of the connection between agency and responsi-
bility. If computational artifacts are agents, it would seem 
that they could be moral agents and bear responsibility for 
actions, especially in cases of technological mishap.
In this paper, we argue that confusion about agency is 
at the root of misconceptions about the possibilities for 
future AI. To begin our argument, we distinguish two types 
of agency and show how the discourse on AI slips from 
one kind to another. We argue that this slip is problematic 
and leads researchers to predict unrealistic futures. We then 
introduce a third kind of agency that includes the first two 
and better describes what happens in AI as it functions in 
real-world contexts. This third model of agency is a heuristic 
for tracing responsibility in technological mishaps. We use 
the VW emission fraud case to explain the three kinds of 
agency since in this case a technological artifact, namely 
software, was an essential part of the wrongdoing and the 
software might be said to have agency in the wrongdoing. 
We then extend the case to include futuristic AI imagining 
AI that becomes more and more autonomous.
We think that a better understanding of agency can pro-
vide a clearer view of responsibility when humans act with 
technology, be it artifacts of today or futuristic AI.
2  Types of agency
In the past, the term ‘agency’ referred to the capacity to act; 
action was distinguished from mere behavior, as in the case 
of the behavior of artifacts; and only those entities with the 
capacity to act were called ‘agents’. Agency was presumed to 
apply exclusively to humans whose acts were seen as result-
ing from intentions. More recently, however, this notion of 
agency has been contested. AI researchers have adopted the 
idea of “artificial agents” (Jennings et al. 1998; Ferber 1999; 
Weiss 1999; Wooldridge 2002; Floridi and Sanders 2004; 
Floridi 2008). In AI, the operations of a program or a robot 
are seen as actions, which means that programs and robots 
count as agents. They are ‘artificial’ in that their actions 
are computational and embodied inside electronic circuits, 
as opposed to the ‘natural’ actions performed by humans. 
What, then, are the implications of saying that AI artifacts 
are (artificial) agents?
The current discourse outside AI draws on multiple 
notions of agency. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philoso-
phy, for example, Schlosser distinguishes a broad and nar-
row meaning of agency:
In a very broad sense, agency is virtually everywhere. 
Whenever entities enter into causal relationships, they 
can be said to act on each other and interact with each 
other, bringing about changes in each other. In this 
very broad sense, it is possible to identify agents and 
agency, and patients and patiency, virtually every-
where. Usually, though, the term ‘agency’ is used in 
a much narrower sense to denote the performance of 
intentional actions. (Schlosser 2015)
Here Schlosser generously expands the notion of agency 
to include entities that are causally efficacious. Entities that 
act with intentions are causally efficacious, though the causal 
chain that explains their actions initiates from intentions. 
Later we will discuss claims made by AI researchers as to 
the intentions of artificial agents.
Literature on agency now spans a number of disciplines 
including Science, Technology and Society (STS) studies, 
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where the notion of agency is extended in a way that is par-
allel to Schlosser’s first sense of agency. For example, actor 
network theory (ANT) introduces a neutral term, ‘actants’ 
to include human and non-human things (including nature, 
ideas, relationships, as well as artifacts) that contribute to 
the production of a state of affairs (Latour 1996; Law and 
Hassard 1999; Sayes 2014). Latour is a leading proponent 
of ANT and as Sayes (2014) explains: “Latour (2005: 71) 
maintains that one need only ask of an entity ‘[d]oes it make 
a difference in the course of some other agent’s action or 
not? Is there some trial that allows someone to detect this 
difference?’ If we can answer yes to these two questions, 
then we have an actor that is exercising agency—whether 
this actor is nonhuman or otherwise” (p. 141).
In this paper, we draw on Schlosser’s two notions of 
agency, referring to them as causal agency (broad) and inten-
tional agency (narrow), and we add a new type, which we 
call triadic agency. Triadic agency is introduced as a way of 
capturing the type of agency that is at work when humans 
act with technological artifacts. We use triadic agency as a 
heuristic device to reveal the role of humans and artifacts 
in producing events. Although nature (e.g. ecosystems) and 
ideas (e.g. fairness) shape what happens, our focus is on 
humans and artifacts. As we will explain later, triadic agency 
not only expands what can be said about them, it grounds 
ascriptions of responsibility, both ethical and legal.
2.1  Causal agency
As already explained, causal agency has to do with causal-
ity. When artifacts are said to be agents in this sense, the 
emphasis is on their causal efficacy. This usage draws atten-
tion to the important role that artifacts have in the causal 
chain that produces states of affairs. This type of agency fills 
a gap since too little attention has been given to the ways in 
which technology shapes what happens in the world. Tech-
nological artifacts can powerfully affect social arrangements, 
relationships, institutions, and values. Treating artifacts as 
agents properly frames them as significant constituents of 
the human world.
Turning now to the VW emission fraud case, we can illus-
trate causal agency for in this case an artifact, i.e., software, 
had an essential role in the wrongdoing. In 2015, the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) discovered that 
diesel engines sold by VW in the US contained a defeat 
device, that is, a device “that bypasses, defeats, or renders 
inoperative a required element of the vehicle’s emissions 
control system”, as defined by the Clean Air Act. Accord-
ing to US officials, the defeat device software was able, by 
means of sensors, to detect when the car was being tested. 
That is, the software included instructions that activated 
equipment that reduced emissions by adjusting catalytic con-
verters and valves when the car was being tested. The same 
software turned such equipment off during regular driving, 
possibly to save on fuel or to improve the car’s performance. 
This meant that the emissions from the cars increased above 
legal limits, even 40 times the threshold values.
So, in this case we have an example of software that is 
causally efficacious; the defeat device controlled the VW 
engines so that they would (seem to) pass the EPA test. 
Hence, the device is an agent according to the definition of 
causal agency. The case is fitting here because it is analo-
gous to Bostrom’s disaster scenario insofar as it involves 
software that harms humans.
Although the defeat device fits causal agency, the agency 
of the defeat device has not been emphasized in discussion 
of the case and no one (to our knowledge) has suggested that 
the defeat device was responsible for the fraud though it was 
an essential element in making the fraud possible.
2.2  Intentional agency
The second type of agency involves the capacity for inten-
tional actions, that is, intentional agents are entities that act 
intentionally. In traditional accounts, only humans can have 
intentions. Since intentions are seen as mental states, arti-
facts do not, strictly speaking, have intentional agency. Com-
puter scientists and others sometimes attribute intentions to 
artifacts but such attributions are metaphorical; artifacts are 
spoken of as if they had intentions. Some suggest that at 
some pivotal moment in the future, AI artifacts might come 
to have something comparable to human intentions but this 
is highly speculative. Intentionality in artifacts is only meta-
phorical. Hence, if someone were to say that the VW defeat 
device was an agent in bringing about the fraud, this would 
either mean causal agency or would have to be interpreted 
as intentional agency metaphorically.
Causal agency and intentional agency share the element 
of causal efficacy, but in Intentional Agency, the agent’s 
intentions begin the chain of causality. Importantly, inten-
tions and intentional action are linked to responsibility 
though the connection is complex. In ethical and legal con-
texts, the presence of particular types of intentions deter-
mines the ascription of responsibility.
Returning to the VW case, in the blame game that ensued 
after the fraud became public, top management and the 
engineers were targeted as the entities that were possibly 
responsible for the fraud. As said before, causal agency is 
not sufficient to initiate a discourse on responsibility. For 
that, intentional agency is needed, which is why the focus in 
the VW case has been on humans, i.e., VW top management 
and engineers. Top management claims that the decision 
to use the defeat device was made by the engineers once 
they realized that the engines on which they were work-
ing would never meet the EPA standards without significant 
improvement (i.e., investments by the company). Allegedly, 
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not wanting to be bearers of bad news to their higher-ups, 
the engineers handled the problem on their own, keeping the 
engines as they were, but adding the defeat device (Smith 
and Parloff 2016). On this account, top management may 
not have had the intention to break the law, though the engi-
neers did.
Nevertheless, in the public debate about the case, inten-
tional actions of top management come clearly into play. Top 
management acknowledges that they specified both goals 
on which the engineers acted (to achieve a particular level 
of performance for the car and to meet the EPA standards). 
Intentionally setting these goals and intentionally creating 
a corporate culture in which engineers feared the conse-
quences of failure (and did not want to tell top management 
that these goals could not be met) can be seen as setting off 
the sequence of events that led to the fraud. The point is 
that the issue of responsibility depends not just on causal 
sequences but on intentions and intentionality.
2.3  Triadic agency
Causal agency and intentional agency each capture some-
thing important about how states of affairs in the world 
are produced. However, neither alone adequately captures 
the full story. For example, in the VW case, causal agency 
covers only the causal efficacy of the defeat device but not 
the intentionality of top management and the engineers. 
Intentional agency covers the intentionality and causality of 
the humans, but not the contribution of the artifact that the 
humans used to realize their intentions. The defeat device 
played a role here both in shaping the intentions of the engi-
neers and in making the fraud possible. Although a simple 
combination of the two might seem to solve the problem, it 
would not capture how the two work together, that is, how 
the intentionality of human actors and the efficacy of arti-
facts interact with one another to produce results like the 
VW fraud.
We propose a combination that we refer to as triadic 
agency. We are not the first to develop a multi-component 
account of agency: the above-mentioned ANT is an exam-
ple of a account involving a network of components. Our 
proposal is to use triadic agency to analyze events involving 
technological artifacts in a way that draws attention in par-
ticular to users, designers, and artifacts—the most powerful 
agents in this kind of event (Fig. 1).
Triadic agency is especially helpful in sorting out 
responsibility.
When humans act with artifacts to achieve goals:
• The user (or users) wants to achieve a goal and delegates 
the task of achieving that goal to the designer.1
• The designer (or designers) creates an artifact in order to 
achieve the goal.
• The artifact provides causal efficacy necessary to achieve 
the goal.
In the VW case, top management (representing the com-
pany) were the users, they had the goal of creating a car that 
would meet EPA standards while also meeting certain per-
formance standards. The engineers were the designers—they 
were tasked with creating a car that would fulfill the goals of 
the top management and they did so by creating an artifact 
that would achieve the goal. They created the defeat device. 
All three together contributed to the achievement of the goal 
to pass the EPA test while also meeting performance stand-
ards and all three were essential to producing the emission 
fraud. All three are part of the agency of the illegal action.
This triadic account of agency allows us to identify 
agency in producing states of affairs while at the same 
time acknowledging that it is neither humans nor artifacts 
alone that do this. Humans and artifacts work together, with 
humans contributing both intentionality and causal efficacy 
and artifacts supplying additional causal efficacy. When 
users delegate to designers, they do so with the intention 
to achieve their goal and when designers accept the task, 
Fig. 1  The triadic agency. From bottom left anti-clockwise: the user, 
the artifact, the designer
1 The term ‘user’ should be understood broadly here to refer to indi-
viduals or groups of individuals that commission the development 
and the deployment of an artifact for their purposes, i.e., to achieve 
their goals. In other words, the users in our Triadic Agency are “com-
missioning users”, possibly distinct from the “end users” of the arti-
fact, to whom the term ‘user’ usually refers to in other contexts, i.e., 
software engineering.
AI & SOCIETY 
1 3
they intend to complete it, that is, they intentionally create 
artifacts that will achieve the delegated goal.
To illustrate the value of adopting a triadic agency 
account of agency, we can use it to think through issues 
of responsibility and in particular issues of responsibility 
with regard to increasingly autonomous artifacts. We will 
not limit ourselves to current technology but will show how 
triadic agency addresses issues of responsibility when it 
comes to fully autonomous futuristic artifacts.
3  Agency and responsibility in autonomous 
futuristic AI
In the current VW case, allegedly the engineers intentionally 
created the defeat device. The link between their intentions 
and the defeat device is direct: the defeat device is comprised 
of certain pieces of code, and that code was written by the 
engineers. Such directness may not hold in the future, since 
technologies are becoming more autonomous with humans 
delegating more and more complicated tasks to intelligent 
machines (e.g. software agents, robots). This raises difficult 
issues in the attribution of responsibility, because human 
beings will rely more and more on the intricate causal effi-
cacy of these machines to accomplish their tasks. What 
if technology reaches a level where humans only need to 
specify a goal and machines are able to write the code to 
reach it? The value of the triadic account of agency can be 
demonstrated by addressing the challenges of responsibility 
ascription posed by the use of these emerging technologies 
and futuristic imaginations of them.
Imagine a futuristic scenario in which VW replaces its 
engineers with an advanced AI that is capable of designing 
software. Imagine further that this AI is given the goal of 
passing the EPA test without making the car more costly. 
Suppose the advanced AI notifies the VW management 
when the goal has been reached. The car passes the test with 
flying colors. Later the EPA discovers that the advanced AI 
has developed and embedded in the car’s software instruc-
tions to control the engine in essentially the same way in 
which the 2015 defeat device operated. In test mode, cata-
lytic converters and valves (or whatever equivalent parts 
there are in a futuristic VW engine) adjust so that the car 
passes the test, only to return to a non-EPA compliant mode 
once the test is over. If this deception were discovered, how 
would agency be understood and how would responsibility 
be ascribed?
3.1  The triadic agency in the futuristic case
Although some might argue the advanced AI is responsi-
ble ethically and/or legally, that would place responsibil-
ity where it would make no sense and do no good. This 
is shown by the triad analysis. Top management is still 
the user, specifying the goals it wants to achieve and the 
defeat device is still the artifact. However, the designer is 
now the advanced AI to which top management delegates 
its goals. The advanced AI, rather than human engineers, 
develops the defeat device. Even in this futuristic case, the 
user (VW management), the designer (the advanced AI), 
and the artifact (the defeat device) together constitute the 
agency that produces the fraud.
3.1.1  The artifact
The agency of the artifact requires the least analysis. The 
defeat device has causal agency: it is causally efficacious 
in the production of the fraud. It does not have intentional 
agency because it does not have any intentions. However, 
since the device plays a role in producing the fraud via its 
causal efficacy, we claim that it is part of the agency of the 
fraud (i.e., triadic agency).
3.1.2  The designer
The advanced AI produced the instructions that consti-
tute the defeat device and its causal efficacy in the fraud. 
The execution of these instructions counts as cheating the 
test in the context of the EPA rules. Did the advanced AI 
produce those instructions intentionally? Certainly not in 
the same sense that the engineers in the current VW case 
intentionally produced the defeat device. The engineers in 
the current case are human beings with intentions (with 
Intentional Agency) while the advanced AI of the future is 
software running on a computer. Does this software have 
intentional agency? Some AI researchers might argue that 
if an AI is advanced enough its acts could be classified as 
intentional agency, but since it consists of software run-
ning on a computer, we argue that it is still in the realm 
of causal agency. To suppose that futuristic AI will have 
intentions in the same way as humans do today is to make 
a leap over the ontological chasm between computational 
artifacts and sentient beings. We will return to this chasm 
later. For now, we treat the advanced AI as having only 
causal agency.
Since advanced AI has only causal agency, it cannot 
have malicious intent or be negligent, both of which require 
intentionality. If either question were raised, the focus 
would quickly turn to the intentionality of those who had 
conceived, designed, deployed, or authorized the use of 
the advanced AI. Since the advanced AI has no intentions, 
responsibility cannot be ascribed to it. However, as with the 
defeat device, the advanced AI is part of the triadic agency 
of the fraud.
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3.1.3  The user
As in the current case, in the futuristic case, top manage-
ment is the user. It uses the defeat device designed by the 
advanced AI to reach the goal of passing the EPA test. Top 
management delegated this goal to the advanced AI. As 
with the artifact and the designer, the user is part of the 
agency that produces the emission fraud. However, top 
management is different in that, unlike the artifact and the 
designer, its members have intentions; they have intentional 
agency. Because of this, top management would be held 
responsible, and what they would be held responsible for 
would be dependent on the nature of their intentionality. 
That is, depending on the details of the case, they might be 
considered ethically reprehensible, negligent, strictly liable 
or to have committed some other complex infraction. As 
the only entity in the triad with intentional agency, was top 
management completely responsible for the fraud? Because 
of its reliance on the advanced AI, instead of jumping to 
such an ascription of responsibility, the relationship between 
top management and the advanced AI needs to be explored 
further. To start, we can ask: what was top management 
thinking when it delegated the achievement of its goal to 
the advanced AI? Answering this question brings into focus 
new relevant entities and a new triad: the designers of the 
advanced AI, and the triad for the creation of the advanced 
AI.
Suppose that top management hired a team of software 
engineers to create an advanced AI for car design and manu-
facture. In the triad for the creation of the advanced AI, top 
management is again the user, human software engineers 
are the designers, and any number of futuristic hardware 
and software tools would be the artifacts that facilitate the 
production of the advanced AI. Top management still plays 
the role of the user, this time with the goal of creating an 
advanced AI that could solve the problem of passing the 
EPA test. In this triad, triadic agency (the combination of 
user, designer, and artifact) produces an advanced AI capa-
ble of solving the problem of the EPA test. Here an analysis 
of the nature of responsibility for creating an advanced AI 
capable of producing something illegal would make sense.
In this triad for creating the advanced AI, the question of 
responsibility focuses on top management and the human 
designers. Since the VW involves a legal infraction, the 
question is whether and/or how each thought about the pos-
sibility of an illegal solution to the challenge of meeting the 
EPA test. Legal responsibility might depend on the answer 
to that question. For example, the user could have had mali-
cious intentions or could have been negligent if it had speci-
fied the goal (to the human designers) to build an advanced 
AI that would solve problems regardless of the legality of the 
solutions. Or the designers might have disregarded the user’s 
specification that the advanced AI be made only to do what 
was legal or the designers might have negligently failed to 
inquire whether the AI would be used in contexts in which 
legal requirements had to be met.
We will not solve the responsibility ascription in this 
futuristic case here. Our point is that even in the futuris-
tic case, the ascription of responsibility would involve an 
inquiry into the behavior of the human components of the 
triad. We have separated agency and responsibility in the 
sense that the three components of the triad are all part of the 
triadic agency that produces the fraud though only the users 
are responsible because they are the only components that 
have intentional agency (the capacity for intentional action).
Why, it might be asked, is responsibility restricted to the 
humans in the triad? The answer is not that responsibility has 
some mysterious metaphysical meaning. Rather our answer 
is that responsibility is a mechanism for motivating people 
to behave in particular ways. This applies to both ethical 
and legal responsibility. When it comes to legal responsibil-
ity, lawyers and legislators often acknowledge that laws are 
intended to shape behaviour. Ethical responsibility also has 
a similar logic. Social notions of responsibility function to 
pressure individuals to act in ways that are good for society. 
In other words, when individuals believe they are responsi-
ble they are more likely to behave responsibly. In the case 
of technological mishaps, responsibility has to be placed on 
those entities who have the capacity to ensure or increase the 
likelihood that bad things will not happen.
We think agency and responsibility should be separated 
in the sense that agency is triadic while responsibility is 
always ascribed to humans. Of course, the kind of responsi-
bility humans bear is complicated because of the delegation 
to artifacts and because of the complexities of negligence, 
malicious intentions, strict liability, etc.
3.2  Triads without humans: can non‑humans have 
intentional agency?
Could there be a triad in which no human and no intentional 
agency is involved? How would the ascription of responsi-
bility work in that case? In order to pose these questions we 
have to imagine a futuristic world well beyond the one we 
have been imagining. As an illustration, we can take Bos-
trom’s futuristic depiction of a superintelligence that gives 
itself goals and designs solutions for those goals. Imagine 
a version of the VW fraud case that involves a superintel-
ligence with human-like desires and intentions and able 
to take over the world. We call this an endpoint VW case, 
because AI futurologists see such superintelligence as an 
artifact at the endpoint of technological development. The 
main difference between this scenario and the earlier futuris-
tic case is that the superintelligence occupies all three verti-
ces of the triad: it would be the user with the goal of passing 
the EPA test, the designer with the capabilities to conceive 
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and implement a solution meeting the EPA standards, and 
would embody that solution, that is, it would be the arti-
fact. The triad has collapsed into one superintelligent entity 
that, presumably, is and does everything, and humans have 
become completely irrelevant.
Earlier we said we would return to the question whether 
futuristic AI might have something that would qualify as 
intentional agency. AI researchers treat AI artifacts as caus-
ally efficacious agents, that is, causal agents. However, in 
their speculations about the future, they imagine that AI 
artifacts will include computational elements that will 
make them agents in the way humans are (Bostrom 2014; 
Omohundro 2016; Yampolskiy 2016). Without worrying too 
much about how computation can create something equiva-
lent to intentions, these AI researchers slip into thinking of 
futuristic AI as having intentional agency. Indeed, futuristic 
AI scenarios import the full mental complexity of humans to 
their AI artifacts talking as if AI can have drives, interests, 
goals, as well as intentions. Here they seem to get trapped in 
the metaphorical meaning of intentional agency.
AI is computational, whereas intentions are not, that is, 
the two are ontologically different. To claim otherwise pre-
sumes that computationalism is correct, that is, that some-
thing computational could be the same as a human mental 
state, i.e., superintelligence would have intentions. We do 
not claim that technological development could never take 
this path because we do not have decisive evidence against 
computationalism. On the other hand, neither can AI futur-
ologists provide evidence in support of the possibility that 
AI artifacts can have intentions like humans do.
Whatever endpoint in the future we can imagine—be it 
one in which AI has intentional agency or not—ascriptions 
of responsibility will follow the sequence of human steps 
that will have led to that endpoint. As in the futuristic VW 
case, humans would have had to make decisions to design 
AI technology in particular ways and would have had to del-
egate operations to it. Those humans would be responsible 
for the AI behavior. Yes, the more developed the AI will 
become, the more distant human decision making will be 
from the execution of operations by the AI. Still, however 
distant the human decisions, they will have to have been part 
of the process at one point or another. Our triadic account 
helps keep track of the agencies and responsibilities in this 
process (Fig. 2).
4  Conclusion
The account of agency that we have presented is intended 
to frame agency in a way that acknowledges the combina-
tion of contributions of users, designers, and artifacts to 
produce states of affairs. The account recognizes that the 
agency at work in the production of states of affairs in the 
world is neither singular nor exclusively human. Although 
users, designers, and artifacts each constitute agency, none 
of them alone can achieve any particular technological state 
of affairs in the world.
The question of agency arises most often when it comes 
to responsibility, for example, in questions such as who is 
responsible for the VW emission fraud. Our account of 
agency provides a basis for analyzing responsibility while 
at the same time clarifying the distinction between agency 
and responsibility. The account purposely selects the role of 
users and designers in order to deal with issues of responsi-
bility. In this way, we are able to represent the key contribu-
tors to states of affairs without slipping into an oversimpli-
fied view according to which, because of complexity, no 
human can be held responsible.
The account is applicable to both present day cases (as 
we have illustrated through the VW case) and futuristic pos-
sibilities. In the former, with human users and designers, we 
can easily detect the locus of responsibility in connection 
with their intentions, i.e., intentional agency. In futuristic 
cases, in which AI technology replaces humans in the role 
of the designer choosing how to achieve human goals, the 
distance between human intentions and artifact operations 
increases. Still, the triadic account allows us to trace human 
responsibility.
In more distant, imagined futuristic cases, no humans are 
presumed to be involved in a triad, that is, AI technology 
Fig. 2  The chain of triadic 
actions in technological devel-
opment always involves human 
decisions at a certain point
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occupies the roles of user and designer. Attribution of 
responsibility then calls for a search into the circumstances 
that led to the implementation of such a technology. Has it 
been designed by humans or by other machines? We need to 
trace back until we find a triad with human users or design-
ers to be able to engage in a discourse on responsibility. 
The distance between the AI technology with its human-
less triad and the point at which humans delegated goals to 
non-humans may be significant. This would make it difficult 
(but not impossible) to attribute responsibility to humans 
for an AI mishap, at least in the form of negligence (if not 
malicious intent).
In a scenario of superintelligent AI, negligence on behalf 
of humans would be based on the delegation of goals to 
AI technology without setting adequate boundaries on its 
behavior. However, we are not interested in the blame game 
that might ensue among humans enslaved by machines in 
an imagined future. We instead propose our triadic analysis 
of agency to sort out what happens now when humans use 
technological artifacts to bring about changes in the world, 
especially when, as in the VW fraud case, humans are behav-
ing badly and in ways that are harmful to other humans.
A careful triadic analysis sheds light on the path of tech-
nological development currently underway and shows that, 
however complex the technology, responsibility still lies 
with humans. By pointing this out, our effort aims at keeping 
responsibility where it will do the most good: to encourage 
humans that design and deploy AI technology to anticipate 
the role of the technology in producing states of affairs.
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